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COMMENTS

IS WISCONSIN'S FRIVOLOUS CLAIM STATUTE
FRIVOLOUS? A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF
WIS. STAT. § 814.025
I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years our courts have been plagued with a dramatic increase in litigation.' A few commentators maintain
that the increasing congestion of the judicial system can be
attributed to the influx of medical malpractice and product

liability suits of the 1970s, 2 while others have attributed it to a
1. The "litigation explosion" has received extensive treatment. See, eg., Burger,
Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Byrd, Malicious Prosecution in
North Carolina,47 N.C.L. REV. 285 (1969); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983); Gold, ControllingProcedural Abuses: The Role of Costs and Inherent JudicialAuthority, 9 OTTAWA L. REV.
44 (1977); Harper, MaliciousProsecution,FalseImprisonment andDefamation, 15 TEx.
L. REV. 157 (1937); Meadows, A FrivolousLawsuit May Destroy the Careerof a Professional: Is There No Remedy?, 12 U. RICH. L. REV. 421 (1983); Owen, Countersuits
Against Attorneys - A Preface, 33 S.C.L. REv. 313 (1981); Special Project, Malicious

Prosecution,33 S.C.L. REv. 317 (198 1); Note, Attorney's Liability to Clients'Adversaries
for Instituting FrivolousLawsuits: A Reassertion of Old Values, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
775 (1979); Note, MassachusettsProhibitsWithdrawal by Court-Appointed Counselfrom
PotentiallyFrivolousAppeals, 16 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 280 (1982); Comment, Sanctions

Imposed by Courtson Attorneys Who Abuse the JudicialProcess, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619
(1977); Note, HabitualPlaintiffsin FederalCourt and the Surrogate PleaderApproach,
45 U. CIN. L. REV. 577 (1976); Note, Physician Countersuits: Malicious Prosecution,

Defamation and Abuse of Process as Remedies for Meritless Medical Malpractice Suits,
45 U. CIN. L. REV. 604 (1976); Note, Liabilityfor Proceeding with Unfounded Litigation, 33 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Unfounded Litigation];
Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject Groundless Litigation, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1561 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Note, A Lawyer's Duty]; Comment, Counterclaimingfor Malicious

Prosecution and Abuse of Process: Washington's Response to Unmeritorious Civil Suits,
14 WILLAMETTE L.J. 401 (1978); Note, Counterclaim ForMalicious Prosecution in the
Action Alleged to be Malicious, 58 YALE L.J. 490 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Counterclaim]. For an interesting investigation of ancient sanctions for meritless suits,
see Note, Groundless Litigation and the Malicious Prosecution Debate: A Historical
Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1221-27 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, Groundless

Litigation].
2. This litigious trend has risen to epidemic proportions in the medical arena. Consequently, numerous books, articles, and commentaries have been devoted to the medical malpractice crisis. For general comments on the subject, see R. COHEN,
MALPRACTICE (1979); R. GOTS, THE TRUTH ABOUT MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1975);
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host of other reasons. Irrespective of the origin of the present
problem, the question still remains: Are there too many lawsuits?4 This question invariably leads to a recognition of the
need to control access to the courts. However, the competing
policies that temper a remedy of this nature are society's interest in adjudicatory relief in an adversarial setting versus the
individual's interest in freedom from unjustifiable litigation.
J. GUINTER, THE MALPRACTITIONERS (1978); J. KING, THE LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN A NUTSHELL (1977); L. LANDER, DEFECTIVE MEDICINE: RISK, ANGER,
AND THE MALPRACTICE CRISIS (1978); Adler, Malicious Prosecution Suits as a Counterbalance to Medical Malpractice Suits, 21 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 51 (1972); Bernstein,
Will No-Fault Insurance End the Medical Malpractice Crisis?, 1978 HosP. 40; Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of Lawyersfor Instituting Unjustified Medical
Malpractice Actions, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (1977); Calabresi, The Problem of
Malpractice: Trying to Round Out the Circle, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 131 (1977);
Gaudineer, Ethics and Malpractice, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 88 (1976); Greenbaum, Physician Countersuits: A Cause Without Action, 12 PAC. L.J. 745 (1981); Holloway, Malicious Prosecution Actions by the Medical Profession Against Attorneys Who
Unsuccessfully PursueA MedicalMalpracticeSuitfor a Patient,TEX. B.J., May 1978, at
421; Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence: An Economic View of
Medical Malpractice, 298 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1282 (1977); Yardley, Malicious Prosecution: A Physician'sNeed for Reassessment, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31 (1984); Note,
Physicians' Actions: The Aftermath of Drago v. Buonagurio, 44 ALB. L. REV. 188
(1979); Note, MaliciousProsecution: An Effective Attack on Spurious Medical Malpractice Claims?, 26 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 653 (1976); Comment, Countersuits to Legal
and Medical Malpractice Actions: Any Chance for Success?, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 93
(1981); Note, Malicious ProsecutionLiability of Plaintiffs Counselfor an Unwarranted
Medical MalpracticeSuit: New Developments in Physician Countersuitsfor Unfounded
Medical MalpracticeClaims, 7 N. KY. L. REV. 265 (1980); Comment, Attorney Liability
for Malicious Prosecution and Legal Malpractice: Do They Overlap?, 8 PAC. L.J. 897
(1977); Annot., 84 A.L.R.3D 555 (1978).
3. Reasons cited for the litigation explosion include: zealous medical malpractice
lawyers, breakdown in relationships and the proliferation of lawyers at a rate too great
for society to absorb, the heightened expectation of professional performance especially
from the increasing number of specialists, the impersonality of professional service delivery, a breakdown in professional screening and discipline caused by the rapid growth
in numbers of professionals, the general increase in consumer litigiousness, awareness of
one's civil rights, increasing population, and industrial as well as commercial growth.
See R. MALLEN & V. LEVIT, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 48 (2d ed. 1981); Specter, Too

Many Lawsuits?, TRIAL, Aug. 1982, at 6. See also Bork, Dealing With the Overload in
Article II1 Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231 (1976) ("The reason for increases so large seems
apparent. We, along with every other western nation, are steadily transforming ourselves into a highly-regulated welfare state.").
4. The answer to the question of whether there is too much litigation does not
turn simply on numbers of cases filed, numbers of months between filings and
trials or numbers of dollars required to operate our judicial system. We must
consider the kinds of cases that have been filed and the objectives and results of
those cases before condemning or limiting citizens' rights of access to the courts.
Specter, supra note 3, at 6.
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If the basis for the increased litigation can be attributed to
the fact that the litigation is less than meritorious or has little
or no probability of success, there are a number of remedies
available to the aggrieved victim. With their genesis stretching from the jurisprudence of ancient Rome, 5 present day
remedies afford the victim of a frivolous suit inadequate protection at best.6 These remedies are primarily judicial in nature. However, recently legislatures in a number of
jurisdictions have recognized the need to enact legislation to
stem the tide of frivolous actions, cross-complaints, counterclaims, defenses, and appeals. 7 Regardless of their source,
these remedies are deficient because they require a finding of
malice,8 a nebulous and archaic concept that has escaped definition by both legislative and judicial lawmakers.
This Comment will analyze the remedies available to the
victim of a frivolous claim. As a preliminary matter, the analysis begins with an overview of traditional judicial remedies,
with an extended discussion on the element of malice. 9 Next,
5. "In Rome, good or bad faith was irrelevant and, depending on the nature of their
claims, losing complainants could be penalized up to a fifth of the amount for which
they had sued." Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1218 n.3.
6. There have been a number of raging debates and comments written proclaiming
the inadequacy of present judicial remedies and urging adoption of other methods. See
Note, A Lawyer's Duty, supra note 1, at 1589 (advocating a suit in negligence for malicious prosecution). ContraBickel v. Mackie, 447 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (N.D. Iowa 1978)
("While it is true that the attorney owes a general duty to the judicial system, it is not
the type of duty which translates into liability for negligence to an opposing party where
there is no foreseeable reliance by that party on the attorney's conduct."). See also
O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, -, 569 P.2d 561, 567 (1977) (leaving open the possibility of an injured opposing party's action against a negligent attorney, but holding that
any such action could only reach injuries already covered by the malicious prosecution
tort); Special Project, supra note 1,at 328-29 ("adopting the internal sanction that is the
pillar of the English system"); Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1219 (arguing for a return to "historically proven solutions").
7. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 814.025 (1983-84). For the full text of the statute, see
infra note 48. See generally Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981).
8. See infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
9. Legal remedies most widely recognized by the courts in prosecuting a frivolous
action are: (1) common-law tort of malicious prosecution, (2) abuse of process, (3)
defamation, (4) professional negligence, (5) prima facie tort, (6) invasion of privacy, (7)
intentional infliction of emotional distress, (8) judicially created federal bad faith, (9)
contempt sanction, (10) Section 1927 of Title 28 of the United States Code, (11) Rule 37
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, (12) inherent power of courts to promulgate
rules affecting attorneys' conduct, and (13) bar disciplinary proceeding. See Friedman
v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 312 N.W.2d 585 (1981). See generally Birnbaum, supra note 2,
at 1003; Special Project, supra note 1; Note, Unfounded Litigation, supra note 1.
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the Comment reviews the Wisconsin frivolous claim statute.
This review of the statute focuses on the statutory and case
law development of the statute and describes the components
of the statute. A critical assessment of the statute follows.
The interrelationship of the statute and the Code of Professional Responsibility is also discussed. Finally, this Comment
argues that the present statute is inequitable and suggests a
more appropriate remedy.
II.

TRADITIONAL COMMON-LAW REMEDIES

A.

Malicious Prosecution

The tort of malicious prosecution was developed by the
courts in response to criminal actions brought without probable cause. 10 Eventually, the courts extended the remedy to
include unwarranted civil proceedings.lI The tort attempts to
balance the competing polices of keeping vexatious lawsuits
out of court and giving justifiable claimants access to the
courts without fear of reprisal by retaliatory litigation.1 2 The
plaintiff bringing an action for malicious prosecution is usually required to prove four elements 3 in a separate proceed10. In some jurisdictions the phrase "malicious prosecution" applies only to unjustifiable criminal proceedings, while the phrase "wrongful use of civil proceedings" or
"malicious use of civil process" is used to distinguish the criminal proceeding from the
wrongful initiation of civil proceedings. See Crawford v. Theo, 112 Ga. App. 83, -,
143 S.E.2d 750, 753 (1965). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 674-681
(1977); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 120, 850-53 (4th ed. 1971).
This Comment considers only wrongful use of civil proceedings.
For an exhaustive discussion of the history of malicious prosecution, see Note,
Groundless Litigation, supra note 1.
11. W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 120, at 850. Due to the internal sanctions of the
English system, that is, corporal punishment and costs, the English system has been
reluctant to follow the American trend and expand this into the civil sector. See id. at
851. The English system provided for costs, and the burden of deterrence in the original action and subsequent suits for malicious prosecution were "developed for and limited to the extraordinary case for which the internal sanctions provided neither
deterrent nor remedy." Note, Groundless Litigation, supra note 1, at 1229.
12. See Mallen, An Attorney's Liability for Malicious Prosecution,A Misunderstood
Tort, 46 INS. COUNS. J. 407, 409 (1979).
13. In some jurisdictions, the number of elements to be proven varies from four to
six under the English rule (requiring the extra element of special damage), or three to
five under the American rule (not requiring the element of special damage). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 (1977), which states:
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ing: 14 (1) termination of the former proceeding in favor of the
One who takes an active part in the initiation, continuation or procurement of
civil proceedings against another is subject to liability to the other for wrongful
civil proceedings if
(a) he acts without probable cause, and primarily for a purpose other than
that of securing the proper adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings
are based, and
(b) except when they are ex parte, the proceedings have terminated in favor
of the person against whom they are brought.
See also Maniaci v. Marquette University, 50 Wis. 2d 287, 297-98, 184 N.W.2d 168,
173-74 (1971) (quoting Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 257 Wis. 228, 231, 43
N.W.2d 244, 246 (1950)), in which the court stated:
The six essential elements in an action for malicious prosecution are:
1. There must have been a prior institution or continuation of some regular
judicial proceedings against the plaintiff in this action for malicious prosecution.
2. Such former proceedings must have been by, or at the instance of, the
defendant in this action for malicious prosecution.
3. The former proceedings must have terminated in favor of the defendant
therein, the plaintiff in the action for malicious prosecution.
4. There must have been malice in instituting the former proceedings.
5. There must have been want of probable cause for the institution of the
former proceedings.
6. There must have been injury or damage resulting to the plaintiff from the
former proceedings.
Id. See also Stidham v. Diamond State Brewery, Inc., 41 Del. 330, 21 A.2d 283 (1941).
14. A defendant cannot cross-claim or counterclaim in an original action. See, eg.,
Babb v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 841, 847, 479 P.2d 379, 381, 92 Cal. Rptr. 179, 181
(1971). The reason generally cited is that one of the necessary elements to support an
action for malicious prosecution is the need to prove the termination of the former
proceeding in favor of the party bringing the action for malicious prosecution. Simply
stated, the rationale for this element is that if the action for malicious prosecution is
brought before the end of the original claim, there is a risk of conflicting judgments
should the defendant win the malicious prosecution case and later lose the original
claim. See Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Security Indus., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 826,
829 (W.D. Wash. 1974); Special Project, supra note 1, at 321; Note, Counterclaim,
supra note 1, at 491. See also Slaff v. Slaff, 151 F. Supp. 124, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ("A
claim which might arise out of the bringing of the main action or out of allegations in
the pleadings, or proceedings taken in the main action, may not be made the subject of a
counterclaim. Such a claim is premature and cannot ripen or mature until the main
action has been determined.").
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that courts may not adjudicate premature actions. See Attoe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 36 Wis. 2d 539, 544, 153
N.W.2d 575, 580 (1967). However, a few jurisdictions have experimented with the idea
that suits for malicious prosecution can be brought in the same proceeding. See, eg.,
Eiteljorg v. Bogner, 502 P.2d 970, 971 (Colo. Ct. App. 1972); Sonnichsen v. Streeter, 4
Conn. Cir. Ct. 659, -, 239 A.2d 63, 68 (1967). Others suggest they would look favorably on such a course. See, eg., Mayflower Indus. v. Thor Corp., 15 N.J. Super. 139, -,
83 A.2d 246, 251 (N.J. Ch. 1951), affd per curiam, 9 N.J. 605, 89 A.2d 242 (1952).
Most, however, have rejected it. See, e.g., Schwab v. Doelz, 229 F.2d 749, 753 (7th Cir.
1956); The Savage Is Loose Co. v. United Artists, 413 F. Supp. 555, 562 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
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plaintiff;15 (2) malice;1 6 (3) absence of probable cause in the
prior proceeding;17 and (4) actual damages in excess of the
costs recoverable in the original action.18
Since its common-law conception in England,' 9 the tort of
malicious prosecution in America has been divided into two
separate and distinct theories: the English rule and the American, or Restatement, rule. These theories differ in terms of
the requisite elements to be proved.2 0 In the minority of juris15. The proceeding must conclude with judgment in favor of the victim or voluntary dismissal by the original plaintiff. See Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Pearce,
121 Ga. App. 835, -, 175 S.E.2d 910, 915 (1970); Thompson v. Beecham, 72 Wis. 2d
356, 360, 241 N.W.2d 163, 165 (1976); Pollock v. Vilter Mfg. Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 29, 37,
126 N.W.2d 602, 607 (1964).
Termination by way of compromise or settlement is not sufficient to support the
action. See, e.g., Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558 (1897); Fenton Storage Co.
v. Feinstein, 129 Pa. Super. 125, 195 A. 176 (1937); Lechner v. Ebenreiter, 235 Wis.
244, 297 N.W. 913 (1940); W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 120, at 853. See also Webb v.
Youmans, 248 Cal. App. 2d 851, 57 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1967); Nolan v. All State Home
Equip. Co., 149 A.2d 426 (D.C. 1959); Nichols v. Severtsen, 39 Wash. 2d 836, 239 P.2d
349 (1951); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 comment j (1977).
"The phrase in his favor is absolutely central to the meaning of the quotation; a
cause of action in malicious prosecution is dependent upon a termination of the preceding action in favor of the defendant therein (the plaintiff in the action for malicious
prosecution)." M. Bryce & Assoc., Inc. v. Gladstone, 88 Wis. 2d 48, 58, 276 N.W.2d
335, 340 (1978) (citation omitted).
16. See infra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
18. The special damage element most commonly associated with the English rule
requires a showing of some injury beyond that generally attendant upon similar forms
of litigation. See Greer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 139 Ga. App. 74, -, 227 S.E.2d
881, 885 (1976) (humiliation, embarrassment, emotional anguish, and ridicule are not
special); Rivers v. Dixie Broadcasting Corp., 88 Ga. App. 131, -, 76 S.E.2d 229, 236
(1953) (business losses are special injuries); Berlin v. Nathan, 64 Ill. App. 3d 940, -,
381 N.E.2d 1367, 1371 (1978) (injury to reputation and increased liability insurance
premiums are not special injuries), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 828 (1979); Carver v. Lykes,
262 N.C. 345, -, 137 S.E.2d 139, 145 (1964) (loss of the right to practice a profession is
a special injury); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, -, 569 P.2d 561, 563 (1977)
("'[s]pecial injury' in this procedural sense excludes the kind of secondary consequences that are common and often unavoidable burden on defendants in 'all similar
causes' "); Alyyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, -, 266 S.E.2d 108, 111 (1980) ("costs to
defend the malpractice action, injury to . . . professional reputation and good name,
plus the loss of present and future earnings and profits" were not special damages).
19. The tort of malicious prosecution originally arose in medieval England by the
enactment of the Statute of Marlbridge in 1269. See Special Project, supra note 1, at
318-20.
20. The reasoning most often proffered for the difference in the elements to be
proven between the English and the American rule is that the tort of malicious prosecution is not a secondary remedy in the United States, as it is in the English system, and
thus there are internal sanctions available in the English system, such as the imposition
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dictions following the English rule,21 the plaintiff has to prove
all four elements. However, in those jurisdictions adhering to
the American rule,22 the plaintiff need not prove the fourth
element commonly known as the special damage requirement,
but must simply show "either material harm or the violation
of costs. Costs are normally not available in the American system. See infra note 72
and accompanying text. Consequently, only when internal sanctions do not provide an
adequate remedy for the extraordinary costs will the tort be invoked, thus the basis for
the element of special damages in England and for those American jurisdictions following the English rule. See Special Project, supra note 1, at 320. See also supra note 11
and accompanying text. An added distinction between the American rule and the common law of England is that English courts refuse to apply the tort of malicious prosecution to an ordinary civil action. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 120, at 851.
21. Sixteen jurisdictions follow the minority English rule. For a list of cases that
established that rule, see O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, - n.3 569 P.2d 561, 564 n.3
(1977). Jurisdictions currently requiring special damages are: Rodriguez v. Carroll,
510 F. Supp. 547 (S.D. Tex. 1981) (applying Texas law); Morowitz v. Marvel, 423 A.2d
196 (D.C. 1980); Taylor v. Greiner, 156 Ga. App. 663, 275 S.E.2d 737 (1980); Petrick v.
Kaminski, 68 Ill. App. 3d 649, 386 N.E.2d 636 (1979); Brody v. Ruby, 267 N.W.2d 902
(Iowa 1978); Hooke v. Equitable Credit Corp., 402 A.2d 111 (Md. App. 1979); Farmers
Gin Co. v. Ward, 73 N.M. 405, 389 P.2d 9 (1964); Gross v. Newburger, Loeb & Co.,
103 Misc. 2d 417, 426 N.Y.S.2d 667 (1980); Koury v. John Meyer of Norwich, 44 N.C.
App. 392, 261 S.E.2d 217 (1980); Dakters v. Shane, 64 Ohio App. 196, 412 N.E.2d 399
(1978); O'Toole v. Franklin, 279 Or. 513, 569 P.2d 561 (1977); Blumenfeld v. R.M.
Shoemaker Co., 286 Pa. Super. 540, 429 A.2d 654 (1981); Jacques v. McLaughlin, 121
R.I. 523, 401 A.2d 430 (1979); Alyyildiz v. Kidd, 220 Va. 1080, 266 S.E.2d 108 (1980);
Fenner v. Lindsay, 28 Wash. App. 626, 625 P.2d 180 (1981); Krieg v. Dayton-Hudson
Corp., 104 Wis. 2d 455, 311 N.W.2d 641 (1981).
22. Twenty-two jurisdictions do not require special damages. See, eg., Turner v. J.
Blach & Son, 242 Ala. 127, 5 So. 2d 93 (1941); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15
P.2d 966 (1932); Leek v. Brasfield, 226 Ark. 316, 290 S.W.2d 632 (1956); Eastin v. Bank
of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 P. 1106 (1884); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo. 461, 15 P.2d 1084
(1932); Calvo v. Bartolotta, 112 Conn. 396, 152 A. 311 (1930); Burchell v. Bechert, 356
So. 2d 377 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); McCardle v. McGinley, 86 Ind. 538 (1882);
Carbondale Inv.Co.v. Burdick, 67 Kan. 329, 72 P. 781 (1903); Graffagnini v. Shnaider,
164 La. 1108, 115 So. 287 (1927); Hubbard v. Beatty & Hyde, Inc., 343 Mass. 258, 178
N.E.2d 485 (1961); Brand v. Hinchman, 68 Mich. 590, 36 N.W. 664 (1888); O'Neill v.
Johnson, 53 Minn. 439, 55 N.W. 601 (1893); Harvill v. Tabor, 240 Miss. 750, 128 So. 2d
863 (1961); Young v. Jack Boring's, Inc., 540 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); McCormick Harvesting Mach. Co. v. Willan, 63 Neb. 391, 88 N.W. 497 (1901); Johnson v.
Moser, 181 Okla. 75, 72 P.2d 715 (1937); Cisson v. Pickens Say. and Loan Ass'n, 258
S.C. 37, 186 S.E.2d 822 (1972); Teesdale v. Liebschwager, 42 S.D. 323, 174 N.W. 620
(1919); Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818 (1896); Closson v. Staples, 42
Vt. 209 (1869); Van Hunter v. Beckley Newspapers Corp., 129 W. Va. 302, 40 S.E.2d
332 (1946).
The Restatement of Torts is in accord with the American rule and does not compel
the victim to show special damages. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674
comment e (1977). See also W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 120, at 853.
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of a legal right23 that is in itself sufficient to support an action
for damages."

B.

Abuse of Process

An alternative to initiating a suit for malicious prosecution
is an action for abuse of process. 24 Abuse of process lies
against one who misuses or misapplies the judicial process for
a collateral objective other than one for which it was designed
to accomplish. 25 Abuse of process is misusing or misapplying
the process, whereas malicious prosecution is based on commencement of an action without probable cause.
The plaintiff bringing an action for abuse of process must
prove three elements: (1) an ulterior purpose; (2) a willful act
in the use of the process not proper in the regular prosecution
of the proceeding; and (3) actual damage.26 The plaintiff need
not prove a favorable termination of the proceeding 27 nor initiation of the proceeding without probable cause. 28 Notwithstanding these differences, 29 both torts are the result of judicial
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 674 comment e (1977).

24. The leading English case on abuse of process is Grainger v. Hill, 132 Eng. Rep.
769 (1838) (defendant had plaintiff arrested to force plaintiff to relinquish a ship register, without which the plaintiff could not go to sea).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977), states: "One who uses a
legal process, whether criminal or civil, against another primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it is not designed, is subject to liability to the other for harm caused by
the abuse of process." See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 121, at 856. See also
Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595 (3d Cir. 1957) (abuse of process is the use of
a justified process for an unjustifiable purpose); Abernethy v. Bums, 210 N.C. 636, 188
S.E. 97 (1936); Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21, 521 P.2d 964 (1974); Brownsell v. Klawitter, 102 Wis. 2d 108, 306 N.W.2d 41 (1981).
26. See, e.g., Templeton Feed & Grain Co. v. Ralston Purina Co., 69 Cal. 2d 461,
446 P.2d 152, 72 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1968); Thompson v. Beecham, 72 Wis. 2d 356, 241
N.W.2d 163 (1976).
27. "Abuse of process may even lie when the prior plaintiff has met with success in
the former action." Maniaci v. Marquette University, 50 Wis. 2d 287, 298, 184 N.W.2d
168, 175 (1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 comment a (1977)

("it is immaterial. . . that the proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting
or initiating it").
28. An action for abuse of legal process will lie even though the plaintiff had probable cause in initiating a prior suit. See Fite v. Lee, 11 Wash. App. 21, -, 521 P.2d 964,
968 (1974). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 comment a (1977) ("it
is immaterial that the process was. . . obtained in the course of proceedings that were
brought with probable cause and for a proper purpose").
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 comment a (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 121, at 856. See, e.g., Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595,
600 (3d Cir. 1957); Huaser v. Bartow, 273 N.Y. 370, -, 7 N.E.2d 268, 269 (1937).
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creation and share the common element of an improper purpose 30 in the use of legal process beyond that anticipated by
the process. 31
C. A Common Element: Malice
The malice or state of mind requirement is found in both
the judicial and statutory remedies. Consequently, both types
of remedies are fatally defective because malice is "hard to
find and still harder to frame. ' 32 And although the malicious
prosecution elements of malice and lack of probable cause
form a "polemic link," 33 the two concepts must be distinguished.34 Both elements are questions of fact with the malice
requirement measured by a subjective standard and the probable cause criterion measured by an objective standard.35
The issue of malice is directly linked to the individual's
primary purpose or motive.36 Malice can be characterized by
30. Although the hallmark of an action for abuse of process is the use of a justified
process for an improper purpose, a claim may be legitimate and still be considered an
abuse of process. See Baird v. Aluminum Seal Co., 250 F.2d 595, 600 (3d Cir. 1957).
31. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 121, at 856. These torts also share
two problems. First, both remedies are of marginal utility because they can only be
brought in a separate suit, long after the injury; the expense of defending a meritless
lawsuit has been inflicted. Consequently, this problem has prompted the legislatures in
a number of states, including Wisconsin, to enact legislation that allows a similar remedy to be pursued in the same proceeding as the alleged frivolous action. See, eg., Wis.
STAT. § 814.025(l) (1983-84). Second, both remedies have traditionally been reserved
for the defendant faced with a frivolous lawsuit. A party confronting a frivolous defense or a frivolous appeal was without recourse. Remedial legislation concerning this
point has been instituted in many jurisdictions including Wisconsin. See id.
32. Meshane v. Second Street Co., 197 Wis. 382, 387, 222 N.W. 320, 322 (1928).
33. Tool Research & Eng'g Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, -, 120 Cal.
Rptr. 291, 297 (1975).
34. See Note, hat ConstitutesMalice and Want ofProbable Cause in an Action for
MaliciousProsecution in Pennsylvania, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 242, 245 (1954) ("Briefly stated,
the decision on the issue of want of probable cause establishes the reasonablenessof the
belief and the decision upon the issue of malice bears upon the honesty of the belief.")
(emphasis in original).
35. Want of probable cause is measured by the objective standard of whether there
was a reasonable belief, while malice is measured by the subjective standard of whether
there is an honest belief.
36. Malice may consist of a primary motive of ill will, or a lack of belief in any
probable success of the action. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 119, at 847-50. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enterprises, Inc., 23 Utah 2d 169, 460 P.2d 333 (1969).
At common law, malice meant an intent to a wrongful harm and injury. See State ex rel
Durner v. Huegen, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N.W. 1046 (1901), afl'd, 195 U.S. 194 (1904). But
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 676 (1977) (defining malice in terms of reck-
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ill-will, anger, evil intent, or by improper motive.37 Each form
of malice meets the malice requirement in a suit for malicious
prosecution. On the other hand, lack of probable cause 38 is
generally described as that which would not warrant a reason39
able person to believe the cause of action is legally valid 4
given the known or reasonably ascertainable circumstances. 0
less disregard for the rights of the defendant); Yelk v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 151
N.W.2d 4, 8 (1967) ("While... willful and wanton disregard for the fact may be the
basis for malice, such wanton and willful conduct must be of such a nature and character as to evince a hostile or vindictive motive.") (emphasis added). See also Ray v. City
Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
Malice is a question of fact to be decided by the jury and can be inferred from
showing a lack of probable cause. See W. PROSSER, supra note 10, § 121, at 855. See
also Crouter v. United Adjusters, Inc., 266 Or. 6, -, 510 P.2d 1328, 1330 (1973); Yelk
v. Seefeldt, 35 Wis. 2d 271, 278, 151 N.W.2d 4, 8 (1967).
37. Typically, malice is characterized as actual (express) malice, and legal (implied)
malice. Actual malice or malice in fact is ill-will, spite, or disregard for the rights of
another. Legal malice or malice in law denotes an absence of a lawful excuse or privileged occasion. Both kinds of malice are actionable in a suit for malicious prosecution.
See Meyer v. Ewald, 66 Wis. 2d 168, 224 N.W.2d 419 (1974). See also Robinson v.
Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 244 Iowa 1084, 59 N.W.2d 776 (1953); 15A WORDS &
PHRASES, Express Malice 554 (1950).
38. One court has articulated the nature of probable cause as it exists in terms of a
mixed question of law and fact involving a two-prong subjective-objective test. The first
prong, the subjective test, is proving that there has been a reasonable investigation and
an extensive search of the current status of the law to support an honest belief that the
action is tenable in the forum in which it is brought. The second prong, the objective
test, is proving that the good faith belief is reasonable. See Tool Research & Eng'g
Corp. v. Henigson, 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, -, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291, 297 (1975).
39. See, e.g., Ray v. City Bank & Trust Co., 358 F. Supp. 630, 638 (S.D. Ohio
1973) (reasonable belief in cause of action in light of the facts known or available on
reasonable inquiry); Masterson v.Pig 'n' Whistle Corp., 161 Cal. App. 2d 323, -, 326
P.2d 918, 926 (1958) ("an honest belief, founded upon facts sufficiently strong to justify
his belief, that grounds exist for the proceeding"); Cornegue v. Gogl Furniture Inc., 217
Kan. 564, -, 538 P.2d 659, 663 (1975); Ruff v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 265 S.C. 563, -,
220 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1975) ("the existence of such facts or circumstances as would
excite the belief of a reasonable mind acting on facts within his knowledge"); Hyde v.
Southern Grocery Stores, 197 S.C. 263, -, 15 S.E.2d 353, 359 (1941) ("reasonable
belief in the existence of facts necessary to sustain an attachment, such belief being
founded on circumstances which would be sufficient to produce such a belief in a man of
ordinary caution"); Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 257 Wis. 228, 232, 43 N.W.2d
244, 247 (1950) ("state of facts in the mind . . . as would lead a man of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest and strong suspicion").
40. In some jurisdictions, the existence of probable cause is dependent on the application of facts to the law. Consequently, the law imposes on the party bringing the
action a standard of reasonableness in ascertaining those facts that support a viable
cause of action when viewed in light of the applicable law. Only those facts that are
known or should have been known to the defendant at the time the original action was
commenced may be considered when determining whether there is probable cause. See
Elletson v. Dixie Home Stores, 231 S.C. 565, -, 99 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1957).
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There are a number of reasons for not relying on the subjective motives of an alleged malicious prosecutor when there
are objective grounds for determining whether there is malicious prosecution or abuse of process. First, "[l]ogically
speaking, it is not feasible that the subjective intent of an individual should be used as a basis by which the objective manifestations of that individual could be established. However,
objective manifestations may quite properly be used to establish the nature or quality of the subjective motivation. ' 41 Second, since it is unlikely there will be actual evidence about
subjective beliefs, 42 rules on probable cause linked to a subjective belief force the trier of fact to consider a matter about
which there is little or no evidence. Third, the subjective test
accomplishes the same result that the objective test accomplishes: 43 if the malicious litigator commences a suit on
grounds upon which no reasonable person would base an action, the subjective rule accomplishes the same as the subjective rule and in fact yields no material benefit.' Finally, this
subjective element may punish one who does not possess a belief of liability on the part of the defendant but does perceive
facts that would lead to an inference of liability and therefore
support a finding of probable cause. This plaintiff would technically lack probable cause and be subject to a suit for malicious prosecution, even though the party was objectively
41. Note, supra note 34, at 246. See also W. SEAVEY, LAW OF AGENCY § 9, at 18
(6th ed. 1964) ("knowledge. . .is subjective, although the evidence to prove it is objective. It is entirely factual ....").
42. In Wisconsin, the statutory remedy for malicious prosecution requires the
plaintiff in such an action to prove both lack of probable cause and malice or in the
alternative, simply malice. To date, cases decided on this issue have refused to acknowledge the requirement of "good faith" or malice, but have been decided on the basis of an
objective test, while making no mention of the subjective test. The most plausible reason for this is that there was no evidence in the record relating to malice - the subjective test. See infra notes 54-69 and accompanying text.
43. See Dobbs, Belief and Doubt in Malicious Prosecution and Libel, 21 ARIZ. L.
REV. 607 (1979).

44. This argument is clearly evident from the generally recognized rule that malice
can be inferred from a want of probable cause. See Elmer v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 257
Wis. 228, 232, 43 N.W.2d 244, 246 (1950). Allowing such an inference suggests that
the subjective test is excess baggage. Furthermore, the allowance of such an inference
suggests that the subjective test accomplishes nothing if the mere proof of probable
cause automatically leads to a finding of malice. Therefore, it is all too clear that what
can be accomplished through objective factors does not need any further buttressing
through subjective factors.
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justified in litigating the grievance.45 In sum, the subjective
test is deficient
in many respects and is "worth little discussion
46
in itself."
III.

WISCONSIN'S FRIVOLOUS CLAIM STATUTE

Characteristic of the 1970s was the phenomenon of increasing litigiousness. In reaction to this phenomenon, the
Wisconsin Legislature addressed the plight of vulnerable litigants who were being "sued when there was no reason for
their legal involvement except bad faith, maliciousness or harassment by someone to injure them. '47 The legislators' concern resulted in Wisconsin's frivolous claim statute. 48 The
49
statute not only gives a statutory protection against frivolous
45. This is based upon the assumption that the bare facts themselves do not support
any kind of liability but only when the inference from these facts is drawn is there a link
to liability on behalf of the defendant.
46. Dobbs, supra note 43, at 619.
47. See Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1981). A
typical case clearly falling within the realm of harassment, maliciousness, and bad faith,
and one which section 814.025 was designed to prevent, is In re Cairo, 115 Wis. 2d 5,
338 N.W.2d 702 (1983). In that case, the attorney filed three separate actions on three
separate occasions for his client against the same defendants. In a related but separate
matter, he simultaneously filed two different suits, one in the district court and one in
circuit court against his client and variously named defendants.
48. Wis. STAT. § 814.025 (1983-84) provides:
(1) If an action or special proceeding commenced or continued by a plaintiff
or a counterclaim, defense or cross complaint commenced, used or continued by
a defendant is found, at any time during their proceedings or upon judgment, to
be frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the successful party costs
determined under § 814.04 and reasonable attorney fees.
(2) The costs and fees awarded under sub. (1) may be assessed fully against
either the party bringing the action, special proceeding, cross complaint, defense
or counterclaim or the attorney representing the party or may be assessed so that
the party and the attorney each pay a portion of the costs and fees.
(3) In order to find an action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or
cross complaint to be frivolous under sub. (1), the court must find one or more of
the following:
(a) The action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint
was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for purposes of harassing
or maliciously injuring another.
(b) The party or the party's attorney knew or should have known that the
action, special proceeding, counterclaim, defense or cross complaint was without
any reasonable basis in law or equity and could not be supported by a good faith
argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
49. "Frivolous" is variously defined. See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 503
(3d ed. 1969) ("[s]o clearly and palpably bad and insufficient as to require no argument
or illustration to show the character as indicative of bad faith upon a bare inspection; as
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suits in terms of providing a statutory remedy, but also encompasses those actions satisfying the elements of malicious
prosecution or abuse of process.50
Wisconsin's frivolous claim statute was enacted in 1978
for the purpose of offering a victim of a frivolous suit a means
of recouping legal expenses5 without starting a separate action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process. A further
justification espoused by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was to
prevent the blackmailing of innocent defendants "into paying
52
something in settlement or else face costs of litigation.
Although the statute is relatively new, it has generated a
handful of reported decisions. 3 Moreover, the recency of the
statute has not detracted from a spectrum of issues presented
a pleading argument, motion or objection."). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 712

(5th ed. 1979).
In Cottrill v. Cramer, 40 Wis. 555, 558 (1876), the court noted that a frivolous
demurrer was one in which it "is so clearly untenable, or its insufficiency so manifest
upon a bare inspection of the pleadings that its character may be determined without
argument or research." The court concluded that the demurrer was not frivolous because of the necessity to provide extensive briefs. Id.
50. See Sundby, Awarding Reasonable Attorney Fees Upon Frivolous Claims and
Counterclaims Under § 814.025 Stats., Wis. B. BULL., May 1980, at 11.
51. See, e.g., Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 299 N.W.2d 856 (1981); Tower
Special Facilities v. Investment Club, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 221, 226, 311 N.W.2d 225, 228
(Ct. App. 1981).
52. Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1981). One commentator observed that given the nature and character of those groups supporting the
enactment of the statute and "[i]f support for legislation indicate its purpose, it is apparent the legislation is designed as at least a partial deterrent to the commencing and
maintaining of groundless litigation, particularly professional malpractice actions."
Sundby, supra note 50, at 14. However, he further noted that it was quite ironic that
"none of the cases in which reasonable attorney fees have been assessed or requested
involved professional malpractice." Id. at 20.
53. Since 1978, sixteen cases have dealth with the frivolous claim statute. See
Stivarius v. DiVall, 121 Wis. 2d 145, 358 N.W.2d 530 (1984); In re Koenigsmark, 119
Wis. 2d 394, 351 N.W.2d 169 (1984); Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 299,
347 N.W.2d 595 (1984); Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605,
345 N.W.2d 874 (1984); In re Cairo, 115 Wis. 2d 5, 338 N.W. 2d 702 (1983); Robertson-Ryan v. Pohlhammer, 112 Wis. 2d 583, 334 N.W.2d 246 (1983); In re Laver, 108
Wis. 2d 746, 324 N.W.2d 432 (1982); County of Portage v. Steinpreis, 104 Wis. 2d 466,
312 N.W.2d 731 (1981); Hessenius v. Schmidt, 102 Wis. 2d 697, 307 N.W.2d 232
(1981); State v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 582, 302 N.W.2d 827 (1981);
Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 299 N.W.2d 856 (1981); Wengerd v. Rinehart, 114
Wis. 2d 575, 338 N.W.2d 861 (Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 114 Wis. 2d 602, 340
N.W.2d 201 (1983); Share Corp. v. Pro-Specialties, Inc., 107 Wis. 2d 318, 320 N.W.2d
24 (Ct. App. 1982); Tower Special Facilities, Inc. v. Investment Club, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d
221, 311 N.W.2d 225 (Ct. App. 1981); Nosek v. Stryker, 103 Wis. 2d 633, 309 N.W.2d
868 (Ct. App. 1981); In re Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981).
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and resolved in these cases. The issues range from constitutional challenges to questions concerning the appropriate statutory standard and application of that standard.
A.

Standard

Although section 814.025 had not been challenged prior to
1981 on a constitutional basis, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in In re Bilsie54 did rule on the appellant's challenge to
the constitutionality of the statute, although it was never
raised at the trial court level. 5 The plaintiffs argued that the
statute was unconstitutional for vagueness because of lack of
ascertainable standards. 6 The court emphatically ruled that
the statutory standard in subsection (3)(b) was an objective
standard 57 by nature because of the need to show that the attorney "knew or should have known" the position taken was
frivolous. The court reasoned further that the standard is sufficiently definite
if it gives reasonable warning to one bent on obedience to the
law when his conduct comes perilously close to that which is
proscribed and if reasonable direction is given to the trier of
fact to make a proper determination when that conduct has
come too close to the proscribed conduct. 8
The reasonable attorney standard enunciated in subsection
(3)(b) also requires that there be lacking "a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing
law."' 59 Until recently, the courts have side-stepped this sec54. 100 Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981).
55. An appellate court must review a constitutional challenge first made on appeal
which raises a question of subject matter jurisdiction. See State ex rel. Skinkis v. Treffert, 90 Wis. 2d 528, 536, 280 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Ct. App. 1979).
56. Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d at 348, 302 N.W.2d at 513. Appellants reasoned that "no
standard is provided by which an attorney or a party can know prior to actual trial that
the action, proceeding, cross-complaint, defense or counterclaim brought is, in the
words of § 814.025 (3)(b), Stats., 'without any reasonable basis in law or equity.' " Id.
57. See Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d at 350, 302 N.W.2d at 514. The statutory language
"knew or should have known" connotes a subjective standard in terms of what was in
the person's mind and whether those actions are intentional. However, in Sommer v.
Carr, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found the objective standard of what would a reasonable attorney have done under the same or similiar circumstances to be more appropriate than the subjective standard. See 95 Wis. 2d 789, 797, 299 N.W.2d 856, 860
(1981). See also Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345
N.W.2d 874 (1984).
58. Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d at 348, 302 N.W.2d at 513.
59. WIS. STAT. § 814.025(3)(b) (1983-84).
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ond statutory requirement when assessing frivolous claims
under the (3)(b) standard. In Radlein v. IndustrialFire &
Casualty Insurance Co.,60 the supreme court stated that the
application of the standard necessarily involves a two-pronged
test. "First, is the law ready for extension, modification or
reversal, and, if not, then secondly, was the argument for such
change made in good faith even though not successful. ' ' 61 The
argument need not be successful as long as it is made in good
faith and made by a reasonable attorney.62
The ascertainment of the relevant facts, their application
to the legal theory, and the determination of frivolousness
must be made by the trial court 63 "during the proceedings or
upon judgment."' If, however, the court is unable to make
these findings for purposes of ruling on the issue of frivolousness, "then the trial court must conduct a hearing 65 for the
'66
purpose of reaching such findings and resulting conclusion.
60. 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984).
61. Id. at 612, 345 N.W.2d at 878.
62. Id. at 614, 345 N.W.2d at 879.
63. The supreme court in Hessenius v. Schmidt, 102 Wis. 2d 697, 307 N.W.2d 232
(1981), concluded that "only a court is empowered to find frivolousness or assess costs
and reasonable attorney fees whether it [is] during a hearing or not." Id. at 704, 307
N.W.2d at 237. The Hessenius court, after reviewing the court commissioner's role
since 1874, declined to grant the court commissioner the right to make determinations
and assessments under section 814.025. The court reasoned that the legislature had
chosen to provide court commissioners with certain powers and that the right to assess
costs and attorney fees and to determine the frivolousness of a procedure was not one of
those rights under sections 799.25(13) and 814.025(1). See 102 Wis. 2d at 702-04, 307
N.W.2d at 235-36. See also Haight v. Lucia, 36 Wis. 355, 360 (1874) (court commissioner's power under the then prevailing statutes "must be expressly conferred by law,
or it does not exist."). But see State ex rel. Perry v. Wolke, 71 Wis. 2d 100, 103, 104,
237 N.W.2d 678. 681 (1976).
64. In In re Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled that a decision of frivolousness can be made before or at the
time of judgment or even after judgment for the purpose of giving the party against
whom a charge is leveled an opportunity to be heard.
65. See Hessenius v. Schmidt, 102 Wis. 2d 697, 701, 307 N.W.2d 232, 235 (1981);
Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1981); Tower Special
Facilities, Inc. v. Investment Club, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 221, 225, 311 N.W.2d 225, 228
(Ct. App. 1981).
66. Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1981). The trial
court, by hearing or otherwise, is obligated to make specific findings under the frivolous
claim statute. See Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 612, 345
N.W.2d 874, 878 (1984). In Fehring v. Republic Ins. Co., 118 Wis. 2d 299, 347 N.W.2d
595 (1984), the supreme court acknowledged the trial court's error in denying the defendant's motion for fees and costs under section 814.025(3) without making any
findings.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:279

A finding of frivolousness cannot be raised in a separate action. 67 And the trial court must state which standard, subsection (3)(a) or (3)(b), was relied upon in finding a violation of
the statute.68 "The statute does not allow the trial judge to
conclude frivolousness or lack of it without findings stating
which statutory criteria were present, harassment or knowledge or imputed knowledge that there was not 'any'69reasonable
basis in law or equity' for the proposition taken."
B.

Awards of Reasonable Costs and Fees

The statute emulates the English tradition and stands out
as an exception to the American rule on attorney fees. 70 England has allowed prevailing litigants to recover attorney fees
from the loser, 71 but in the United States, the loser of a court
battle generally does not have to account to the victor for reasonable attorney's fees. 72 Subsection two of the Wisconsin
67. One court acknowledged that the statutory language does not expressly limit a
section 814.025 action to a finding in an original action, but rather implies such a limitation. No other case had raised a section 814.025 recovery in a separate action. See
Tower Special Facilities, Inc. v. Investment Club, Inc., 104 Wis. 2d 221, 226, 311
N.W.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 1981). See, e.g., Hessenius v. Schmidt, 102 Wis. 2d 697, 307
N.W.2d 232 (1981) (raised by counterclaim in original proceeding); State v. State Farm
Fire & Cas. Co., 100 Wis. 2d 582, 302 N.W.2d 827 (1981) (motion during original
proceeding upon dismissal of third-party complaint); Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789,
299 N.W.2d 856 (1981) (requested during original proceeding upon dismissal of thirdparty complaint); City of Janesville v. Wiskia, 97 Wis. 2d 473, 293 N.W.2d 522 (1980)
(post-judgment motion before same trial court).
68. See, e.g., Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345
N.W.2d 874 (1984); Badger Bearing, Inc. v. Drives & Bearings, Inc., 111 Wis. 2d 659,
331 N.W.2d 847 (Ct. App. 1983) (remanded to the trial court to draw conclusions concerning the presence or absence of the statutory criteria).
69. Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 792, 299 N.W.2d 856, 857 (1981).
70. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
71. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF DAMAGES 234-36 (1935); Ehrensweig, Reimbursement of Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 792 (1966).
72. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975).
The majority's denial of attorney fees in Alyeska was influenced by the enactment of
specific provisions by Congress for the recovery of attorney fees. For a comprehensive
list of these provisions, see Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 254-7 1.
An added justification for refusing to award fees is to ensure ready access to the
courts by reducing penalties for failure. However, to the litigant who prevails, its effect
is a partial denial of justice. See Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney
Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974). Additionally, the American rule is
riddled with court formulated exceptions allowing attorney fees. Some of these include
the common fund exception, see Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1882); the willful disobedience exception, see Toledo Seale Co. v. Computing Seale Co., 261 U.S. 399
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statute authorizes the assessment of costs and fees7 3 against
either the attorney or the party bringing the action.74
In assessing costs and fees, there are three areas to be cognizant of. First, the use of "shall" in subsection one requires
the court to award costs and fees upon the finding of a frivolous action. 75 Second, although the costs referred to are already recoverable under section 814.04,76 those very same
costs may be awarded by the court against the offending attor(1923); and the bad faith exception, see Vaughan v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962). See
generally Dawson, supra note 72.
Wisconsin strictly adheres to the American rule and has not recognized any of the
court made exceptions to the rule. However, Wisconsin does allow recovery of fees
under specific statutory provisions. See Milwaukee v. Leschke, 57 Wis. 2d 159, 161,
203 N.W.2d 669, 670-71 (1972) ("in this state, costs are regulated exclusively by statute
as a matter of legislative discretion"); City of Beloit v. Town of Beloit, 47 Wis. 2d 377,
393, 177 N.W.2d 361, 370-71 (1970) ("the award of costs is wholly dependent upon
statutory provisions"). See also Gustin v. Johannes, 36 Wis. 2d 195, 208, 153 N.W.2d
70, 78 (1967); Rheingans v. Hepfler, 243 Wis. 126, 134, 9 N.W.2d 585, 589 (1943).
For general commentary on the topic, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 71; Kuenzel, The
Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost ofLitigation?,49 IowA L. REV. 75 (1963); McCormick,
CounselFees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15 MINN. L.
REV. 619 (1931); McLaughlin, The Recovery of Attorney's Fees: A New Method of Financing Legal Services, 40 FORDHAM L. REV. 761 (1972); Stoebuck, Counsel Fees Included in Costs: A Logical Development, 38 U. COLO. L. REV. 202 (1966); Comment,
CourtAwarded Attorney's Fees andEqual Access to the Court, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636,
648-55 (1974); Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie?, 20 VAND.
L. REV. 1216 (1967).
73. Wis. STAT. § 814.025(1) (1983-84). For the full text of the statute, see supra
note 48.
74. Wis. STAT. § 814.025(2) (1983-84).
75. See Karow v. Milwaukee County Civil Serv. Comm'n, 82 Wis. 2d 565, 570, 263
N.W.2d 214, 217 (1978). The recognition by the legislature in the meaning of the two
words is clearly demonstrated when the legislature provides that costs and fees "may"
be assessed to either the party or attorney in subsection two and when the legislature
uses "shall" in subsection one. Consequently, the court is not vested with discretion in
whether to award fees and costs upon finding frivolousness, but is only granted discretion in determining against whom they will be awarded. See Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis.
2d 789, 299 N.W.2d 856 (1981). See generally Sundby, supra note 50.
76. Wis. STAT. § 814.04 (1983-84) provides in pertinent part:
Except as provided in § 814.025, when allowed costs shall be as follows:
(1) ATrORNEY FEES. (a) When the amount recovered or the value of the
property involved is $1,000 or over, attorney fees shall be $100; when it is less
than $1000 and is $500 or over, $50; when it is less than $500 and $200 or over,
$25; and when it is less than $200, $15.
(b) When no money judgment is demanded and no specific property is involved, or where it is not practical to ascertain the money value of the rights
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ney as well as the party.17 And third, the use of the word
"reasonable" in subsection one granted courts not only discretion as to who will be assessed the costs and fees under subsection two but also discretion as to what constitutes reasonable
fees 8 and what items are properly included in the award for
costs and fees. 79
involved, attorney fees under par. (a) shall be fixed by the court, but shall not be
less than $15 nor more than $100.
(c) No attorney fees may be taxed on behalf of any party unless the party
appears by an attorney other than himself or herself.
(2) DISBURSEMENTS. All the necessary disbursements and fees allowed by
law; the compensation of referees; a reasonable disbursement for the service of
process or other papers in an action when the same are served by a person authorized by law other than an officer, but the item may not exceed the authorized
sheriff's fee for the same service; amounts actually paid out for certified copies of
papers and records in any public office; postage, telegraphing, telephoning and
express; depositions including copies; plats and photographs, not exceeding $50
for each item; an expert witness fee not exceeding $100 for each expert who
testifies, exclusive of the standard witness fee and mileage which shall also be
taxed for each expert; and in actions relating to or affecting the title to lands, the
cost of procuring an abstract of title to the lands. Guardian ad litem fees shall
not be taxed as a cost or disbursement.
(4) INTEREST ON VERDICT. Except as provided in § 807.01(4), if the judgment is for the recovery of money, interest at the rate of 12% per year from the
time of verdict, decision or report until judgment is entered shall be computed by
the clerk and added to the costs.
(6) JUDGMENT BY DEFAULT. If the judgment is by default or upon voluntary dismissal by the adverse party the costs taxed under sub. (1) shall be onehalf what they would have been had the matter been contested.

(7)

JUDGMENT OFFER NOT ACCEPTED.

If the offer ofjudgment pursuant to

sec. 807.01 is not accepted and the plaintiff fails to recover a more favorable
judgment he shall not recover costs but the defendant shall have full costs to be
computed on the demand of the complaint.
77. See WIS. STAT. § 814.025(2) (1983-84).
78. To establish reasonableness, record evidence is required in those cases where
the fees are in dispute. In all other cases, reasonableness of fees can be determined by
the trial court's inherent power which is premised on the court's supervisory control of
the practice of law, and on the judge's expert knowledge regarding the value of legal
services. See Stivarius v. DiVall, 117 Wis. 2d 62, 342 N.W.2d 782 (Ct. App. 1983), for a
list of various means of establishing reasonable attorney fees.
79. See WIs. STAT. § 814.025(1) (1983-84).

1985]

SECTION 814.025

C. Proceedings Covered by Section 814.025(2)
The frivolous claims statute applies to five areas:80 (1) actions, (2) special proceedings, 8' (3) counterclaims, (4) defenses, and (5) cross-complaints. Because appeals are not
included within this list of proceedings, the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals has ruled that appeals could not be considered frivolous. 82 The court reasoned that an appellate procedure does
not fit within the ambit of determining the frivolousness of an
action. Subsection one requires a finding of frivolousness to
be found "at any time during the proceedings or upon judgment.18 3 Because an appellate procedure does not occur immediately after judgment, the court ruled that it does not
come within the time periods covered by the statute. 84 Irrespective of this ruling, the Wisconsin Legislature has enacted
legislation under section 809.25(3)85 to curb initiation of frivolous appeals. Section 809.25(3) is very similar in wording to

80. See WIs. STAT. § 814.025(3) (1983-84).
81. In Share Corp. v. Pro-Specialties, Inc. 107 Wis. 2d 318, 320 N.W.2d 24 (1982),
the issue before the court was whether in a nonsummary criminal contempt proceeding,
costs and fees could be awarded under section 814.025 after the defendant's defense was
ruled to be frivolous. The court ruled that such a proceeding was not a criminal proceeding as argued by the defendant and therefore not subject to the rule espoused in
City of Janesville v. Wiskia, 97 Wis. 2d 473, 293 N.W.2d 522 (1980), that criminal
proceedings are excluded from section 814.025. The plaintiff erroneously based his argument on the distinction that the proceeding was a special proceeding and therefore
covered under section 814.025. The proper analysis is whether the proceeding is criminal in nature or noncriminal and therefore not excluded from section 814.025. The next
step is to determine whether it is a frivolous action, special proceeding, counterclaim,
defense, or cross-complaint. Therefore in Share, since the trial court had already categorized the frivolousness as one of defense, the appropriate argument to be made by the
plaintiff is that it was a frivolous defense after the plaintiff had successfully argued that
it was not a criminal procedure. Arguing that it was not a criminal procedure does
nothing to establish whether it is criminal in nature or not. Clearly, a special procedure
can have a criminal overtone to it and thereby be excludable.
82. In re Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 356-57, 302 N.W.2d 508, 517 (Ct. App. 1981).
83. Wis. STAT. § 814.025(1).
84. See In re Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 356-57, 302 N.W.2d 508, 517 (Ct. App. 1981).
85. Wis. STAT. § 809.25(3) (1983-84) states in full:
(3) Frivolous appeals. (a) If an appeal or cross-appeal is found to be frivolous by the court, the court shall award to the successful party costs and fees
under this section.
(b) The costs and fees awarded under par. (a) may be assessed fully against
the appellant or cross-appellant or the attorney representing the appellant or
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that found in section 814.025.86 Consequently, interpretation
of this statute can be drawn from the growing body of case
law interpreting section 814.025. 87
IV.

SCRUTINIZING SECTION

A.

814.025

CriticalAnalysis

The chief virtue of Wisconsin's frivolous claim statute is
that it allows the victim of a frivolous action to pursue a remedy against the perpetrator in the same proceeding as the original action. Before this section was adopted there was no
method by which the innocent party could recoup legal expenses without starting a separate action.8 8 Additionally, the
statute takes aim not only at frivolous lawsuits but also at
frivolous defenses, counterclaims, and cross-claims.8 9 However, the major drawback of this section is that it still requires
a finding of malice.
Upon reviewing the elements of malicious prosecution
and abuse of process 90 and comparing those with the elements
in a suit for frivolousness under section 814.025, it is clear that
by its very terms the statute requires two of the elements composing a claim for malicious prosecution. 91 The legislature
has essentially codified the common law torts of malicious
prosecution and abuse of process. A brief review of section
cross-appellant or may be assessed so that the appellant or cross-appellant and
the attorney each pay a portion of the costs and fees.
(c) In order to find an appeal or cross-appeal to be frivolous under par. (a),
the court must find one or more of the following:
1. The appeal or cross-appeal was filed, used or continued in bad faith,
solely for purposes of harassing or maliciously injuring another.
2. The party or the party's attorney knew, or should have known, that the
appeal or cross-appeal was without any reasonable basis in law or equity and
could not be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law.
86. See supra note 48.
87. See In re Koenigsmark, 119 Wis. 2d 394, 351 N.W.2d 169 (Ct. App. 1984).
88. See Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 793, 299 N.W.2d 856, 858 (1981).
89. See Wis. STAT. § 814.025(1) (1983-84).
90. See supra text accompanying notes 13-18 & 26-28 for a categorized listing of
the elements of both torts.
91. The (3)(b) standard requires an absence of any reasonable basis in law or equity, which translates into a probable cause standard. Additionally, it calls for a good
faith argument which is essentially the subjective standard pertaining to motive or malice. See WIS. STAT. § 814.025(3)(a), (b) (1983-84).
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814.025 demonstrates that the standard under subsection 3(a)
"bad faith" - is in essence a standard of malice. Likewise,
the standard in section 3(b) - "good faith" - is a standard of
malice. Therefore, both standards have an element of subjectivity to them.
The statute is entitled "Costs upon frivolous claims and
counterclaims." This title suggests that the statute is aimed at
preventing frivolous actions regardless of the form they may
take and what source they originate from. Clearly, frivolous
actions by statutory definition include not only those that are
malicious but also those that are prosecuted without any reasonable basis in law or equity. 92 Additionally, the legislative
history of the original bill defined frivolous as "not honestly
debatable under law," and the case law suggests that frivolous
can be defined as an "indefensible" position.93 Given the definitions of what constitutes frivolousness, the statute's primary
purpose must be to eliminate frivolous actions as that term is
broadly understood. Accordingly, frivolous pursuits include
more than malicious prosecutions and many times do not
have an element of malice to them. In fact, many frivolous
actions are not the result of malice but rather the result of two
specific factors: shortage of facts and attorney incompetency.
The first category, shortage of facts, stems from the attorney's inability to obtain facts without which an attorney cannot satisfactorily appraise the merits of a case. 94 Facts of
paramount importance are often in the possession of the opposing party and therefore not discoverable until the lawsuit is
filed. Consequently, an attorney may proceed with an action
that is meritless in the hope of discovering the crucial facts.
However, this attorney will be faced with two procedural obstacles that hamper the truth-finding process. The first obstacle is the streamlined notice pleading rules. These rules may
permit the opposing party to withhold the details underlying

92. For the full text of Wis. STAT. § 814.025 (1983-84), see supra note 48.
93. See Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 797, 299 N.W.2d 856, 859 (1981).
94. An illustrative case on this point is In re Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d
508 (Ct. App. 1981). In that case the plaintiff commenced an action with less than all
the facts. Later, the defendant under court order provided facts to the plaintiff which

showed the untenable nature of the plaintiff's case. Nonetheless, the plaintiff continued
to prosecute his action which was then ruled to be frivolous.
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an action. 9" The second obstacle is the increasing cost of discovery. 96 This cost may contribute to a lack of relevant facts

with which to appraise a case when the amount in controversy
does not justify the expense of obtaining additional information. 97 The alternative to proceeding in light of the missing
data is to forego any further advancement and possibly risk a

suit for legal malpractice. Thus, many lawsuits may be frivolous not because of maliciousness but rather because of an

honest lack of facts that is promoted by the judicial system
itself.
Attorney incompetency likewise contributes to the flood of

frivolous litigation. An attorney with little knowledge in an
area of law may take a position not supported under any inter-

pretation or reading of the law.9 8 Even if this attorney
harbors a good faith belief that the position is supported by

the law, the result is a frivolous pursuit. Also, a position with
no legal support may be deemed frivolous at first glance, but if

argued rationally and logically, can soon be turned into an
arguable position, much to the credit of the attorney. By the
same token, the mere inability of an attorney to articulate the

client's position in an appropriate and rational manner can
turn a credible action into a frivolous one. 99 Because frivolous
actions include actions that stem from something other than
95. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957) (purpose of today's pleadings is to
give fair notice without all the details).
96. Costs of discovery includes: out-of-pocket expenses for employing discovery
mechanisms, the expense of responding to the opponent's discovery demands, preparing
discovery requests, and the client's time spent in assisting in discovery, such as appearing in a deposition or submitting to a medical examination. These all contribute to
inflated discovery costs which in many cases are not justified. See Note, Discovery
Abuse Under the FederalRules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982).
97. See Note, supra note 96, at 357. The costs of discovery and the amount of
information to be gathered are controlling factors in two situations: (1) when the suit is
being prosecuted on a contingent fee basis, and (2) when the client monitors the attorney's expenditures which accrue to the client. If these two conditions do not occur,
discovery is less of a limiting factor on the amount of material retrieved because attorney fees (discovery costs) are a cost to the client but a benefit to the attorney. "The
interests of attorney and client in this respect are thus diametrically opposed." Id. at

358 n.36.
98. See In re Swartwout, 116 Wis. 2d 380, 342 N.W.2d 406 (1984) (the court found
negligent and incompetent handling of the client's claim in that he knew or should have
known that the action he commenced on behalf of his client was barred by the Federal
Employees Compensation Act).
99. See Dobbs, supra note 43. Similarly, an attorney's inability to articulate either
the law or the facts or both should not turn a credible lawsuit into a frivolous one.
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malice and the statute's purpose is to eliminate frivolous actions regardless of their source or motivation, it is astonishing
that the Wisconsin Legislature still requires a finding of malice before an action can be deemed frivolous. Requiring a
finding of malice is an inappropriate standard when objective
factors can be used as argued above.lco Since frivolous lawsuits are generally composed of the very same ingredients that
contribute to a finding of want of probable cause in a suit for
malicious prosecutions, the statute should be constructed
along the lines of a probable cause theory rather than tying it
to an element of malice.
B.

Case Law Commentary

After Wisconsin's frivolous claims statute became effective
in 1978, no published appellate opinion considered the section
until nearly two years later in Sommer v. Carr.10 1 In Sommer,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that the issue was
not whether there was a reasonable basis in law or equity for
the action but rather whether the attorney knew or should
have known that the claim was frivolous. 10 2 By framing the
issue in this manner, the court impliedly chose to put emphasis on the first half of the subsection 3(b) standard1 0 3 rather
than the last half."° Consequently, the court interjected considerable confusion into its holding. The problem can be more
readily understood in the following manner. The purpose of
section 814.025 is to award costs and fees for frivolous actions,
and subsection 3(b) attempts to determine what actions are
frivolous.10 5 Since the proper question in any section 814.025
case is whether the challenged act is frivolous, to state that an
100. See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text for a review of the inadequacies
of the malice element.
101. 95 Wis. 2d 651, 291 N.W.2d 301 (Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 299
N.W.2d 856 (1981).
102. See 99 Wis. 2d at 797, 299 N.W.2d at 859.
103. The court chose to emphasize the following language of section 814.025(3) as
the appropriate determinate of a frivolous action: "[tihe attorney knew or should have
known. . . ." See 99 Wis. 2d at 799, 299 N.W.2d at 860.
104. The court did not address and failed to explain the significance of the following language of section 814.025(3)(b): "[W]ithout any reasonable basis in law or equity
" See 99 Wis. 2d at 799,
and could not be supported by a good faith argument ...
299 N.W.2d at 860.
105. See 99 Wis. 2d at 792, 299 N.W.2d at 857.
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action is frivolous because the attorney knew or should have
known the action is frivolous begs the question. Instead, a
better understanding is gained by giving credence to the statutory words "reasonable basis in law or equity" 10 6 and by reading both phrases together.
Less than three weeks later, the court of appeals had an
opportunity to construe section 814.025. In In re Bilsie,107 the
court found that the objection raised by the opponent of a will
was not frivolous while the attorney was assessing the case,
but was frivolous when the opponent continued to object after
being presented with additional evidence of testamentary capacity. 10° The court rejected the opponent's contention that
there need only be "some credible evidence" to support the
litigant's action and thereby avoid a finding of frivolousness. 10 9 The court concluded that the better test for purposes
of avoiding a claim of frivolousness was whether a party has
the requisite amount of evidence to meet a party's applicable
burden of proof.110
A 1983 Wisconsin Supreme Court decision involved an action brought by a plaintiff to collect the premium for an insurance policy ordered by the defendant. In Robertson-Ryan v.
PohihammerI11 the defendant failed to appear for trial. The
counsel for defendant attempted to find his client, but was unsuccessful. After the trial judge told defense counsel that a
default judgment would be entered against him if the trial did
not proceed immediately, counsel elected to try the case without his client present for purposes of avoiding a default judgment. After the plaintiff presented one witness, the defendant
did not introduce any direct evidence, but instead cross-ex106. Wis. STAT. § 814.025(3)(b) (1983-84).
107. 100 Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981).

108. Id. at 345, 302 N.W.2d at 511 (medical records indicating testamentary
capacity).
109. Id. at 353, 302 N.W.2d at 515.
110. See id. The court noted that in a case alleging lack of testamentary capacity,
the party making such an allegation has the burden of proving that incapacity to the

trier of fact by clear and satisfactory evidence. Id. Therefore, whether an action has a
reasonable basis in law or equity depends on whether the person advancing the action
has sufficient evidentiary facts to provide "any reasonable basis" to meet the party's
burden of proof or that claim or defense. Id. at 354, 302 N.W.2d at 516.

111. 112 Wis. 2d 583, 334 N.W.2d 246 (1983).
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amined the plaintiffs witness. The trial court found the defense to be frivolous; the supreme court reversed.
Initially, the supreme court recognized that a lack of affirmative evidence does not in itself establish that the defense
is frivolous. 12 Furthermore, the court noted that the defendant pleaded a defense which had a reasonable basis in law and
equity. 11 3 However, the court did not give sufficient consideration to the disappearance of the defendant's only witness, nor
did it measure the defendant's sufficiency of evidence in accordance with the burden of proof standard as enunciated in
Bilsie when it required the party to produce the requisite
amount of evidence to meet the applicable burden of proof
throughout the entire court action for purposes of being
11 4
deemed to have "any reasonable basis" in law or equity.
Therefore, the supreme court was obligated to assess the defendant's defense in terms of whether it was frivolous before
the disappearance of his evidence and after the disappearance
of his evidence. Instead of continuing to monitor the sufficiency of defendant's evidence throughout the pretrial period,
the court assumed that once it was determined at the pleading
stage that the party had enough evidence to support a viable
defense, the defendant would continue to have enough evidence and thereby avoid a ruling of frivolousness. The holding in Robertson-Ryan, thus, allows a party to effectively
circumvent the Bilsie holding. It is entirely possible that it
cannot be determined whether a party's act has a reasonable
basis in law or equity until the trial is complete, since the
party's act could conceivably be determined to be reasonable
only on cross-examination at trial, as was the case in Robertson-Ryan.

112. See id. at 590, 334 N.W.2d at 250.
113. "The answer alleged that Pohlhammer was not liable for the premium because
he cancelled the application for insurance." Id.

114. The Bilsie court determined that the objector's claim to mental incompetency
was not frivolous while the attorney was assessing the case but was frivolous after new
facts as to the competency of the decedent had entered the picture. Therefore, when the
objector continued to press her claim in light of the new evidence, the court awarded
attorneys and guardian ad litem fees for services after the date in which the new evidence was introduced. The introduction of new evidence essentially made it impossible
for the objector to meet her burden of proof. See Bilsie, 100 Wis. 2d at 346, 302 N.W.2d
at 512.
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In each case decided on the basis of subsection (3)(b), the
court has ignored the second element that must be established
before an action can be deemed frivolous. In failing to put the
party to its burden of proof on the element of good faith and
in failing to address this element in its opinions, the court has
affirmatively altered the legislative mandates. In Radlein v.
IndustrialFireand Casualty Insurance Co. ,115 the only case to
mention the good faith element, the supreme court gave it a
cursory treatment and summarily dismissed the case. In the
sixteen cases1 16 decided in this area the courts appear to be
sending the legislature a clear message. Simply stated, the
courts believe that the element has no place in the determination of frivolous actions and is rectifying this deficiency by
deleting it. Therefore, the victim of a frivolous proceeding
should be able to rely on objective factual evidence in an attempt to meet the second standard of section 814.025.
V.

DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AND SECTION

814.025

One of the arguments most frequently cited against the
frivolous claim statute is that assessment of fees and costs
against the attorney infringes upon the attorney-client relationship by preventing attorneys from zealously representing
their clients, and espousing new theories of law.I" The opposing argument is that a lawyer is an officer of the court whose
duties to the public at certain points transcend the fiduciary
duty owed to the client. Moreover, an attorney has an obligation to respect the legitimate interests of fellow members of
the bar, the judiciary, and the administration of justice. However, the Code of Professional Responsibility notes that these
duties are not inconsistent. The attorney's duty to both the
legal system and to the client "are the same: to represent
one's client zealously within the bounds of the law."' 18 A
closer examination of section 814.025 in conjunction with pro115. 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874 (1984).
116. See supra note 53 for a listing of these cases.
117. "Frivolous action claims are an especially delicate area since it is here that
ingenuity, foresightedness and competency of the bar must be encouraged and not stifled." Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 613, 345 N.W.2d
874, 879 (1984). For constitutional considerations, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (access to courts).
118. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-19.
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visions of the supreme court rules reveals that the requisite
facts to establish a violation of section 814.025 also provide
the foundation for a violation of the Supreme Court Rules. 119
A.

Canon Seven

Canon seven imposes the duty to represent one's client
"zealously within the bounds of the law." 120 The Ethical Considerations restate this idea of zealous representation and Disciplinary Rules DR 7-101 and DR 7-102 require a lawyer to
seek "the lawful objectives of his client through reasonable
available means permitted by law,"' 12 1 but to do so in a manner that does not serve "to harass or maliciously injure another."' 122 Unlike the double standard in section 814.025,123
Canon seven adheres to a single subjective standard.124 Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states that a "lawyer shall not file a suit,
assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other
action . . .when he knows it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."' 125 Additionally, an attorney is not allowed to "knowingly advance a claim or defense that is unwarranted under
existing law . . . unless supported by a good faith argument
for an extension [or] modification ..... 126 Nonetheless, "a
lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litigation that
is frivolous."'12 7 Therefore, the language of the Code suggests
that a violation of its provisions will only be found by applying the subjective standard and that the provisions of the
Code may aid a party in properly determining what meets the
subjective standard of bad faith in section 814.025(3)(a).
119. In formulating section 814.025 the legislature used wording nearly identical to
that of Supreme Court Rule 20.36 (ABA Code, supra note 118, DR 7-102). "Under
these circumstances, a court making a finding that sec. 814.025 is applicable must find
the facts which indicate possible violation of the disciplinary rule in SCR 20.36." See
Sommer v. Carr, 99 Wis. 2d 789, 794 n.4, 299 N.W.2d 856, 860 n.4 (1981).
120. ABA Code, supra note 118, Canon 7.
121. Id., DR 7-101(A)(1).
122. Id., DR 7-102(A)(1).
123. Section 814.025(3)(a) provides the litigants with a subjective standard while
subsection (3)(b) provides for an objective standard. See generally supra notes 54-62
and accompanying text.
124. See Note, Unfounded Litigation, supra note 1, at 769-70.
125. ABA Code, supra note 118, DR 7-102(A)(1).
126. Id., DR 7-102(A)(2).
127. Id., EC 7-4.
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B. Canon Two
In State v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. 128 the Wisconsin Supreme Court discussed the similarity of section 814.025
and the Code as it is incorporated into the Wisconsin Supreme
Court rules. When counsel for the plaintiff realized that the
court intended to assess costs and fees against both his client
and himself, he moved to withdraw from representation. In
denying counsel's motion the trial court noted the duty imposed on an attorney under Disciplinary Rule 2-109, which
precludes a lawyer in the first instance from accepting employment in which the client seeks to assert either a malicious
claim or one not supported by a good faith argument in law. 129
Additionally, the court noted the attorney's duty to withdraw
if, in the course of employment, it becomes obvious to the lawyer that the employment violates Disciplinary Rule 2-110.13°
The trial court stated that a lawyer wishing to represent a client must be prepared to accept the penalty if the court awards
costs and fees under section 814.025. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed, and Justice Abrahamson, concurring, stated
that "the lawyer's obligation to comply with the Code and the
lawyer's desire to avoid the adverse financial consequences imposed under section 814.025 may conflict." 131 She concluded
by noting that "[t]he Code. . . and section 814.025 . . . are
in some respects related, but the nature of the relationship is
1 32
far from clear."'
The significant factor with respect to withdrawal from employment under Disciplinary Rule 2-110 is that in some cases
the attorney is required to withdraw 133 and in other cases is
permitted to withdraw. 134 Additionally, this provision of the
Code requires the attorney to request the permission of the
128. 100 Wis. 2d 582, 302 N.W.2d 827 (1981).
129. See ABA Code, supra note 118, DR 2-109.

130. See id. DR 2-110.
131. State Farm, 100 Wis. 2d at 608, 302 N.W.2d at 840 (Abrahamson, J.
concurring).

132. Id. at 609, 302 N.W.2d at 840.
133. ABA Code, supra note 118, DR 2-110(B).
134. Id., DR 2-110(C).
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court before withdrawing. 135 Generally, "the Code adopts a
limited view of what constitutes grounds for withdrawal."' 3 6
C. Canons One, Six, and Nine
The other provisions necessarily impacting on frivolous
proceedings are Canons one, six, and nine.13 7 Canon six imposes on the attorney a minimum level of competency. Ethical Consideration 6-1 suggests that a "lawyer should act with
competence and proper care in representing clients,"' 138 and
Disciplinary Rule 6-101 forbids a lawyer from handling "a
legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances."' 139 The impact of this provision of the Code on section 814.025 is clear. Although the Code prohibits an
attorney from incompetently handling a legal matter, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in In re Bilsie'4° did not require the
highest level of competence or legal ability. 141 In determining
whether the statutory standard is met, the objective standard
would be used. 142 Likewise, a violation of Disciplinary Rule
6-101 would be measured in accordance with an objective
standard, since the purposes underlying the Code provisions
are to maintain a minimum level of competency. However,
the use of the objective standard with respect to the statute
promotes a separate interest in the efficiency of the adversarial
process, the preservation of judicial resources, and the reduction of cost.
While Canon six can be characterized as client-oriented,
Canons one and nine are oriented toward protecting the interests of the judiciary, members of the bar, and the administration of justice. Canon one requires attorneys to "assist in
maintaining the integrity and competence of the legal profes135. Id., DR 2-11O(A)(I).
136. Note, A Lawyer's Duty, supra note 1, at 1588.
137. Canon one provides: "A Lawyer Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity
and Competence of the Legal Profession." ABA Code, supra note 118, Canon 1. Canon six provides: "A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Competently." Id., Canon 6.
Canon nine provides: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional
Impropriety." Id., Canon 9.
138. Id., EC 6-1.
139. Id., DR 6-101(A)(2).
140. 100 Wis. 2d 342, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct. App. 1981).
141. Id. at 350, 302 N.W.2d at 514.
142. Id.
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sion." 143 Pursuant to Canon one, Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)
forbids lawyers from engaging in conduct that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation" or that which is
"prejudicial to the administration of justice."" Finally, Canon nine promotes the interest of the legal system. 45 The
Ethical Considerations challenge the attorney to "promote
146
public confidence in our system and in the legal profession."
Therefore, the promotion of frivolous claims would hamper
the efficiency of the adversarial system and defeat the purpose
of Canon nine.
In summary, 47 the Code and its wealth of case law may
prove to be an invaluable tool in resolving disputes arising
under section 814.025. Furthermore, it may provide a useful
guide as to the types of conduct that will be a basis for a frivolous claim action under section 814.025.
D. Code of ProfessionalResponsibility Standard
Four years after the enactment of section 814.025, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court had its first opportunity to rule on
a matter involving violations of both section 814.025 and the
Code. In In re Lauer,148 the primary issue was whether the
disciplinary proceeding was based on the belief that a violation of section 814.025 was a per se violation of the Code. The
court, after recognizing that although the statute and rule
20.36 were similar but not identical, stated that "assessment of
143. ABA Code, supra note 118, Canon 1.
144. Id., DR 1-102(A)(4), (5).
145. Id., Canon 9.
146. Id., EC 9-1.
147. For a more thorough examination of the relevant canons and disciplinary
rules, see Sutton, The American Bar Association Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 48
TEX. L. REV. 255 (1970). See also Cady, Canons to the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility, 2 CONN. L. REV. 222 (1969-70).

148. 108 Wis. 2d 746, 324 N.W.2d 432 (1982). Lauer commenced an action in
mandamus on behalf of his client against a town board and three board members. The
trial court dismissed the action. Later, Lauer started a second action against the same
board members for negligence. The trial court dismissed the action and awarded costs
and fees under section 814.025. The court ruled that in light of the 1978 judgment, any
suit based on the alleged negligent acts concerning compliance with statutory regula-

tions would be prohibited by the doctrine of res judicata. Subsequently, the Board of
Attorneys Professional Responsibility informed him that they would investigate him for
a violation of Supreme Court Rule 20.36 based on the violation of section 814.025. The
board subsequently found Lauer in violation of the Code.
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costs under the statute does not, of itself, constitute a violation
of our rule of professional responsibility."' 4 9 As pointed out
by the court, the fundamental difference between the statute
and the Code is that under the statute the attorney must
know, or should know, that the action has no reasonable basis

in law or equity, while a violation of the Code requires the
attorney to knowingly advance a claim not warranted under

existing law. 150 Finally, the supreme court noted that the
standard to be applied in the disciplinary proceeding is not the
same standard as applied under section 814.025.15 The court
concluded that the subjective standard of whether the attor-

ney knew the proceeding had no basis in law or equity and
could not be supported by a good faith argument was the ap-

propriate standard.152 Therefore, the assessment of costs
against the attorney under section 814.025 does not per se re-

sult in a violation of the Code.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although Wisconsin, by enacting section 814.025, has
made major strides in recognizing that meritless suits should
not be left to common-law remedies, the task confronting both
the legislature and the courts is to resolve the problem of how
to implement the section fairly, efficiently, and
unambiguously.
A.

The Standard of Culpability

Section 814.025(3)(b) requires both a finding of no reasonable basis in law or equity to support the act and a good faith
149. Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d at 756-57, 324 N.W.2d at 438. "It does not follow that
where there is a violation of the statute there must be a violation of the disciplinary
rule." Id. at 757, 324 N.W.2d at 438. See supra note 119 and accompanying text for a
review of the similarity between the code and section 814.025.
150. See Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d at 757, 324 N.W.2d at 438.
151. See id. at 756-57, 324 N.W.2d at 438.
152. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text. The Lauer court found that
because of the different policies being advanced by the Code and the statute, different
standards had to be applied. The statute is concerned with the costs, both in terms of
time and money, incurred by litigants and the court system itself as a result of the
frivolous action. On the other hand, the Code is promoting the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary action. See
Lauer, 108 Wis. 2d at 757, 324 N.W.2d at 439.
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argument. 153 The added requirement of good faith could be
dealt with in two ways. First, the legislature could amend
subsection (3)(b) by eliminating this particular phraseology,
since the idea of good faith or bad faith is already incorporated into subsection (3)(a). In the alternative, the clause
could remain but with some added guidance as to what the
legislature means by this requirement, either in the form of a
comment or in the form of a definitional subsection. If the
legislature does not believe it proper to effect a change, the
judiciary should recognize the dual requirement in subsection
(3)(b) and give it meaning when rendering a decision based on
(3)(b). With the exception of the Radlein court, 154 the courts
have generally glossed over this requirement. And even when
deliberately recognizing this second requirement, the supreme
court has not determined what exactly is good faith. The
problem still facing the court is what constitutes good faith.
Finally, out of a desire to minimize the risk of a chilling effect
on the advancement of innovative legal theories,1 55 it may be
best to delete the element of malice and add the element of
lack of probable cause before a proceeding can be found to be
frivolous.
B.

Costs

Sanctions against meritless claimants should be graded
primarily according to the magnitude of the injury inflicted.
The sanction should be designed to compensate the wronged
parties for all damages suffered or expenses reasonably incurred as a result of the unfounded suit. Factual dishonesty
and other extreme abuses could justify punitive damages.
With respect to assessment of costs and fees against attorneys, it is clear that withdrawal as suggested by the Code156 is
not a viable solution in attempting to control frivolous pursuits. If an attorney incorrectly decides that the client is attempting to maliciously injure another, the attorney may be
subject to a malpractice claim. On the other hand, an attor153. See Wis. STAT § 814.025(3)(b) (1983-84).
154. Radlein v. Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345 N.W.2d 874
(1984).
155. See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems with FederalRule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1976).
156. See ABA Code, supra note 118, DR 2-110.
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ney could withdraw from a case due to some underlying reason and justify such withdrawal under the pretense that the
client's wishes involved the bringing of a frivolous action.
Therefore, the court or the legislature needs to face the issue
of whether an attorney should be assessed costs and fees after
advising the client not to proceed, but the client refuses.
C. Alternative Solution
An entirely different and more practical approach to the
problem of deterring frivolous actions can be found in the recently proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 157 Rule 68, "Pertaining to Offers of Judgment,"
would be deleted and replaced with "Offer of Settlement;
'
Sanctions."158
Simply stated, proposed Rule 68 would penalize a party who "refuses an offer that turns out to match or
157. In September 1984, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of
Judicial Conference proposed various new rules and amendments to the existing rules.
See PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Appellate Procedure, FederalRules of Civil Procedure,FederalRules of CriminalProceduresand Rules
GoverningSection 2254 Cases and Section 2255 Proceedingsin the United States District
Courts (September 1984).
158. Proposed Rule 68 states in full:
At any time more than 60 days after the service of the summons and complaint on a party but not less than 90 days (or 75 days if it is a counter-offer)
before trial, either party may serve upon the other party but shall not file with
the court a written offer, denominated as a [sic] offer under this rule, to settle a
claim for the money, property, or relief specified in the offer and to enter into a
stipulation dismissing the claim or to allow judgment to be entered accordingly.
The offer shall remain open for 60 days unless sooner withdrawn by a writing
served on the offeree prior to acceptance by the offeree. An offer that remains
open may be accepted or rejected in writing by the offeree. An offer that is
neither withdrawn nor accepted within 60 days shall be deemed rejected. The
fact than an offer is made but not accepted does not preclude a subsequent offer.
Evidence of an offer is not admissible except in proceedings to enforce a settlement or to determine sanctions under this rule.
If, upon a motion by the offeror within 10 days after the entry of judgment,
the court determines that an offer was rejected unreasonably, resulting in unnecessary delay and needless increase in the cost of litigation, it may impose an
appropriate sanction upon the offeree. In making this determination the court
shall consider all of the relevant circumstances at the time of the rejection, including (1) the then apparent merit or lack of merit in the claim that was the
subject of the offer, (2) the closeness of the questions of fact and law at issue, (3)
whether the offeror had unreasonably refused to furnish information necessary
to evaluate the reasonableness of the offer, (4) whether the suit was in the nature
of a "test case," presenting questions of far-reaching importance affecting nonparties, (5) the relief that might reasonably have been expected if the claimant
should prevail, and (6) the amount of the additional delay, cost, and expense that
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exceed the amount finally awarded." 59 Through this method,
frivolousness is determined on the basis of six objective factors
and the only question remaining for the appellate courts is
whether the trial court abused its discretion. Although this
rule would determine whether a suit is frivolous or not, it is
much broader since it includes within its application those
claims that are both nonfrivolous and frivolous. Additionally,
it is broader in an important respect: the sanction allowed
under these cases is much broader than simply awarding costs
and attorney fees. For example, an "appropriate sanction"
can also include interest that could have been earned.
This rule eliminates any need for determining whether an
action is commenced with malice, 160 thereby dispensing with
the primary problem of defining malice. The legislature, by
adopting a version similar to Rule 68 would eliminate the entire problem of what constitutes good or bad faith and additionally prevent any further judicial disobedience of its
legislative directives.
As clearly stated in the committee notes to Rule 68, the
rule still preserves the chief virtue of section 814.025: this rule
would apply with equal force to both plaintiffs and defendants, as does section 814.025.161 And unlike former rule 68,
but in tune with section 814.025, the sanction includes both
attorney fees and costs. 162 Furthermore, the rule, in relying
the offeror reasonably would be expected to incur if the litigation should be prolonged.
In determining the amount of any sanction to be imposed under this rule the
court also shall take into account (1) the extent of the delay, (2) the amount of
the parties' costs and expenses, including any reasonable attorney's fees incurred
by the offeror as a result of the offeree's rejection, (3) the interest that could have
been earned at prevailing rates on the amount that claimant offered to accept to
the extent that the interest is not otherwise included in the judgment, and (4) the
burden of the sanction on the offeree.
This rule shall not apply to class or derivative actions under Rules 23, 23.1,
and 23.2.
159. Frank, On the Merits: FrivolousSuits Targeted,70 A.B.A. J., July 1984, at 28.
160. In Wisconsin, both statutory standards require a subjective finding of malice.
In subsection 814.025(3)(a), there must be "bad faith," and in subsection (3)(b), there
must be lack of a "good faith argument."
161. The Committee attributed the rule's past failure to the fact that it was available only to defendants and not to plaintiffs.
162. Previously, the rule only allowed "costs." This limitation contributed to the
rule's failure since costs absent attorney fees were considered too small a factor to motivate parties to use the rule.
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on six enumerated objective factors, of which malice is not
one, suggests that meritless litigation may be attributable to
something other than malice.
D. A Final Word
In the final analysis, Wisconsin's frivolous claim statute
does not answer the initial question posed in this Comment
concerning the number of lawsuits. However, the statute does
challenge the legal profession to consider the nebulous concept of justice and to adhere to at least a minimal standard of
care. In this way, the statute may affect the quality of the
lawsuits more than their quantity and thus avoid being labelled frivolous.
JAY W. ENDRESS

